This article analyses the determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe. Individuals in developing countries decide on whether to apply for asylum, balancing the costs of staying versus the costs of migrating. Results confirm that economic hardship as measured by income, growth and economic discrimination against ethnic minorities leads to higher flows of asylum seekers. Income and equity improvements in source countries can therefore reduce migration pressure. However, political oppression, human rights abuse, violent conflict and state failure are also important determinants, casting doubt on the mis-conception of all asylum seekers as 'bogus' (economic) refugees. Migration networks and geographical proximity are important facilitators of asylum flows as predicted by theory. Colonial experience, religious similarity and casual contact with the developed world (aid, trade and tourism) are not. Natural disasters and famines are also not statistically significant determinants. These events are typically short-term and unexpected, whereas asylum migration to Western Europe requires planning and preparation. 
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This article provides the first comprehensive quantitative analysis of the causes of asylum migration to Western Europe. Existing studies mainly address refugees crossing national boundaries, the majority of which is located in developing countries, and internally displaced persons (IDPs), exclusively located in developing countries. 16 A specific focus on asylum seeking in developed countries can be justified on a number of grounds. To start with, the rising number of migrants asking for asylum in developed countries, rather than the much higher number of refugees in developing countries has caught the attention of the public, media and policy makers alike and has resulted in various defensive policy measures aimed at reducing these numbers. Quantitative studies of the causes of refugee and IDP flows in developing countries suggest that human rights abuses and generalized political violence are important causes for refugee flight, but are they also causes of asylum seeking in developed countries? Given that asylum seekers in developed countries make up less than 30 per cent of worldwide refugees and IDPs 17 , and are typically excluded from many refugee studies 18 , it is unclear whether the same causes drive both phenomena. A priori, there might be good reasons to presume that the causes will be different. Indeed, the popular perception is that asylum seekers are mainly economic migrants and therefore 'bogus' rather than 'genuine' refugees.
This article is structured as follows. We first discuss what makes people seek asylum using a theoretical framework of utility maximization. Next, we review the existing empirical literature. We then present our research design and results, test the sensitivity of and discuss the results before concluding in the final section. We will estimate models, in which we include a large and complex set of explanatory variables to capture the fact that the determinants of asylum migration are potentially very complex as well. 16 See, for example, Schmeidl 1997 , Davenport, Moore and Poe. 2001 , Moore and Shellman 2002a 17 UNHCR 2002. 18 For example, Schmeidl 1997 , Gibney et al. 1996 , Apodaca 1998 Theoretical Considerations: What Makes People Seek Asylum?
Much of the existing literature on the determinants of asylum seeking, or of migration more generally, distinguishes between factors pushing people out of their country of origin and factors pulling people towards the country of destination. 19 Here we will conceptualize the decision to lodge an application for asylum more directly as the consequence of utility maximizing behavior. 20 An individual weights the costs of staying in one's country of origin versus the costs of migrating to the country of destination. If the costs of staying exceed the costs of migrating, then the individual or in some cases the whole family, will decide to migrate and file an application for asylum. 21 It is likely that this decision-making by asylum seekers is influenced by a complex range of mutually non-exclusive factors. Due to space limitations, we can only sketch these factors here.
Before looking at these factors, it is important that our conceptualization should not be misinterpreted. The decision to migrate might well be undertaken under time and other pressure, but even in these cases a decision to leave the country is in effect taken. 22 We therefore also draw on insights from the general literature on voluntary migration, 23 fully aware that sometimes asylum seekers will have fled their country under imminent threat to their own personal integrity or that of their family.
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The Costs of Staying
As concerns socio-economic factors, the traditional neoclassical economic approach to migration emphasizes the importance of the relative difference in wage rates and rate of return to human capital in the destination and countries of origin as decisive factors in the international migration decision. 24 Poor living standards and employment opportunities in the country of origin make it more attractive to seek improvement of one's economic fortune abroad. This concurs with Marxist or world systems analysis, which regards migration pressure to the core of developed countries as a consequence of economic deprivation at the periphery. 25 Human capital economic theory also predicts that people of working age are most likely to migrate as they have a higher chance to increase their living standards than others.
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Oppressive political conditions raise the costs of staying for all individuals, except those forming part of the oppressing political elite. Restrictions on the freedom to associate, to assemble, to voice dissident political opinions and to compete for political office can therefore be expected to be positively associated with asylum flows. The same holds true for any form of threat to the personal integrity of individuals. This threat could come from various sources.
It could come from the government or government-controlled agencies in the form of human rights violations and the killing of political dissidents. A threat could also come from dissident groups, however, who use violence in their attempt to overthrow the existing political regime. In most cases, there will be a combination of threats from both government and dissident sides, most clearly visible in periods of civil war, often facilitated and spurred by foreign policies of external parties. 27 The threat can also come from another country in the 24 Bauer and Zimmermann 1994. 25 Wood 1989.
26 Massey et al. 1993 , Borjas 1994 . 27 Teitelbaum 1984. 8 case of an inter-state war. Lastly, geography reminds us that threats to one's personal integrity can also come from the exposure of human beings to natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and the like. 28 The same is true for famines, which are often a consequence of the combination of adverse natural conditions with violent political conflict. 29 Quite clearly, threats to one's personal integrity significantly raise the costs of staying. Also, threats to personal integrity can go hand in hand with damage to the economic opportunities of affected individuals, thus reinforcing the socio-economic factors influencing the decision-making.
The Costs of Migration
The costs of migration are normally high given that one leaves one's familiar surroundings and culture and needs to adapt to new living conditions, possibly a new language and a different culture in the country of destination where the existing population might view immigrants with suspicion and hostility. As The Economist has put it: "Leaving one's home to settle in a foreign land requires courage or desperation". 30 If only for this reason most people stay put rather than leave their country of origin. In addition, there are also the direct costs of migration in the form of transportation and information costs. Since fewer people in very impoverished countries will have the resources available to finance their migration, it is widely suggested that the effect of the level of economic development on migration could be 9 with respect to the political regime in the source country. Democratic countries restrict entry, but rarely exit of citizens, whereas harsh autocracies often impose limitations on leaving the country. The effect of autocracy on migration might therefore be bell-shaped as well. In harsh autocracies leaving the country is difficult, whereas full democracy takes away an incentive to leave.
More generally, factors that facilitate the transition from one country to another will lower the costs of migration and therefore be associated with higher asylum flows. For example, cultural and religious similarity helps to reduce the costs of adjusting to the new country of destination. Similarly, the systems approach suggests that existing links and personal contacts between destination and country of origin might also facilitate migration as they make individuals more familiar with the other country. Higher inflows of aid, trade or tourism might enhance such contacts. 32 Individuals from countries of origin which were colonized by Western developed countries in the past, might face lower costs of migration to these countries. 33 This is because the former colonial power's language is often spoken in the former colony as well. In addition, there are often long-term residents from former colonies living in the destination country who can help in finding jobs and who provide some cushioning of the cultural shock linked to migration to a foreign country.
Similarly, according to network theory a higher number of past asylum seekers from a particular country of origin lowers the costs of migration for those left behind. 34 This is because positive examples have been set that migration can be done, and more or less dubious businesses will have evolved to help in getting visas or arranging for transportation (traffickers). In addition, already existing asylum seekers might help newcomers in finding 32 Bilsborrow and Zlotnik 1994. 33 Robinson and Segrott 2002.
34 Massey et al. 1993 , Koser and Pinkerton 2002 , Robinson and Segrott 2002 10 their way in the country of destination and in the search for employment. 35 Immigrants tend to cluster spatially in order to lower the costs of migration. 36 Destination countries often try to prevent such clustering without much success.
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Geographical proximity will also lower the costs of migration as boats or land transport can be used, whereas long geographical distance to the country of destination raises the costs of migration as air transport is required. Since most refugees do not have the means to overcome great geographical distances they become IDPs, or refugees in neighboring developing countries rather than asylum seekers in the developed world.
Finally, generous welfare provisions for asylum seekers lower the costs of migration.
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Conversely, deterring measures such as restrictions on welfare benefits and working rights, the risk of one's application becoming rejected due to low recognition rates, limited appeal opportunities and the threat of forced removal all raise the costs of migration. Developed countries have gone a long way over the last decade or so to raise these costs of migration. Böcker and Havinga 1998 , Havinga and Böcker 1999 , Schuster 2000 , Noll 2000 11 fact that many of these restrictions indiscriminately raise the costs of migration for 'genuine' refugees and for those in search for improved economic living conditions, even though the measures are usually justified by the perceived need to deter only the latter.
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A Review of Quantitative Refugee and Asylum Migration Studies
Given the political and social attention that the number of asylum seekers has attracted over the last decade or so, there is a surprising lack of quantitative analysis of the causes of these flows. There are more studies either looking at flows of refugees and IDPs in general, which mainly reside in countries in the developing world, or explicitly restricting the analysis to developing countries. We start with a review of these studies before turning to the fewer existing studies of asylum migration to developed countries. to flee to countries with a better human rights record. 45 Whilst providing interesting evidence, these studies have obvious limitations. One is sample selection bias in that they are confined 42 Steiner 1999, Gibney 2000. 43 Edmonston 1993. 44 Apodaca 1998. 45 Gibney, Apodaca and McCann 1996. 12 to a selection of countries, where refugee flows have actually taken place on a large scale. In addition, with the exception of Edmonston's study they do not control for other determinants than human rights violations. Salvador rather than economic factors. This finding is disputed by Jones 1989 who uses spatial map analysis to find that migrants mainly came from areas with economic setbacks. Even he suggests, however, that "few would dispute that the civil war in El Salvador is the root cause of migration to the United States" (Jones 1989, 194) , triggering such economic setbacks. 56 Vogler and Rotte 2000.
57 Rotte, Vogler and Zimmermann 1997. 15 asylum seekers divided by the population of the country of origin. The political regime in the source country does not matter, but human rights violations have a positive effect on migration. A positive effect is also found for the urbanization rate. Existing immigration groups attract greater asylum flows. German aid flows to source countries do not matter, whereas trade flow coefficients are significant, but with an unexpected negative sign.
Thomas Holzer and Gerald Schneider analyze the combined number of asylum seekers over the period 1990 to 1995 in Germany and Switzerland, using a negative binomial regression technique in a cross-sectional sample. 58 Referring to their general model, they find that poorer countries with higher infant mortality rates send more asylum seekers. Human rights violations exert a positive effect on asylum migration as do geographical closeness and existing migrant groups. A dummy for violent conflict as well as a variable measuring the number of war deaths turn out to be highly insignificant.
Summing up, in comparison to the studies looking at refugees and IDPs in developing countries, the studies addressing asylum migration to developed countries indicate that economic factors are more important determinants of migration. This is not surprising given that the developed countries are much richer than the developing countries. Where included, the political regime and violent political conflict do not matter, but human rights violations do.
To our knowledge, there does not exist any quantitative study of asylum migration to developed country destinations other than Germany and Switzerland. The only quantitative study of asylum in European Union (EU) countries investigates what makes asylum seekers coming to the EU choose between various destination countries, but it does not address the causes of asylum seeking in the first place. 59 Our study aspires to fill this gap. In covering all 58 Holzer and Schneider 2000. 59 Böcker 1998.
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Western European destination countries we cover flows of asylum migration more comprehensively, also accounting for the fact that asylum seekers often substitute one destination country for another in reaction to deterrence measures. In addition, we test a more comprehensive range of potential determinants of asylum migration. In particular, we want to find out whether the political regime and the incidence of violent political conflict really are irrelevant for explaining flows of asylum seeking.
Research Methodology
Estimation Technique
We estimate the following model
(1)
The subscript i represents each country of origin in year t, y is the number of people filing for asylum. The second term on the right-hand side is the ASYLUMSTOCK variable, on which more below. The vector x contains the explanatory variables. The (t-1) year-specific dummy variables T capture general developments such as lower transportation costs and tighter communication links, which facilitate the search for asylum for individuals in all countries of origin.
60 They also capture policy measures to reduce the number of asylum seekers, such as visa restrictions, sanctions for carriers, the benefits for and general accommodation conditions of asylum seekers and the like to the extent that these policy measures apply to all countries of origin equally. Their inclusion is important as these policy measures are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. The u i represent individual unobserved 60 Wood 1989 , UNHCR 2000 or latent country effects. These capture time-invariant characteristics of countries of origin that are either not measurable or not captured by our explanatory variables. The v it is a stochastic error term.
We first estimate (1) with fixed effects (FE), which is a natural estimator to use given that our countries in the sample are fixed. We employ standard errors that are fully robust and adjusted for the clustering of observations, i.e. observations are merely assumed to be independent across countries, but not necessarily within countries. The FE estimator subtracts from the equation to be estimated the over time average of the equation for each country.
Because of this so-called within transformation the individual country effects u i are wiped out and the coefficients are estimated based on the time variation within each cross-sectional unit only. Any correlation of the fixed effects with the explanatory variables is therefore rendered unproblematic. Unfortunately, by definition the FE estimator cannot estimate time-invariant explanatory variables. We therefore also estimate (1) with a population-averaged generalized estimating equation (GEE) estimator with an assumed Gaussian distribution of the dependent variable. The GEE estimator is asymptotically equivalent to a random-effects estimator, but additionally allows standard errors to be adjusted for clustering.
For both estimators, the dependent variable is logged in order to render its distribution less skewed, after adding one to make such logging possible for zero values. Such a procedure can be problematic, as shown by Gary King who suggests using special regression techniques instead of logging for count data, that is for discrete, strictly positive data with typically a substantial share of values of zero. 61 A common technique for count data is an estimator based on the assumption that the underlying data is Poisson distributed. However, it implicitly assumes that the conditional mean and the variance functions of the dependent variable are 61 King 1988 61 King , 1989 18 equal. 62 If this assumption does not hold, then Poisson regression is insufficiently conservative and hugely overestimates the significance of variables. 63 Test runs showed that this is the case here. In sensitivity analysis, we therefore used a popular alternative, the population-averaged GEE estimator with a negative binomial distribution of the dependent variable, which does not depend on the assumed equality of the conditional mean and variance functions. Standard errors are again adjusted for clustering on countries of origin.
The second term on the right-hand side variable, ASYLUMSTOCK, is similar to a lagged dependent variable. We take the sum of the past five to two year dependent variable rather than the simple one-year lag of the dependent variable for two reasons. One is to average out coincidental temporary ups and downs and to capture the more long-term presence of groups of asylum seekers from specific countries of origin. Hence, whilst the dependent variable is a flow, ASYLUMSTOCK is a stock variable as it name suggests. Second, the value of the immediately preceding year is left out to mitigate correlation of the variable with the error term. The reason is that correlation of one of the regressors with the error term leads to bias in OLS estimation results (Nickell, 1981; Anderson and Hsiao, 1981) . To avoid this bias one would need to employ a first-differenced estimator such as Anderson and Hsiao's (1981) twostage least squares (2SLS) first-differenced estimator or Arellano and Bond's (1991) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. However, both estimators require the use of instrumental variables in the form of lags. Such a procedure always leads to a loss of efficiency in estimation. The researcher is therefore faced with a trade-off between a bias in FE estimation and loss of efficiency in 2SLS or GMM estimation. We therefore have to live with the fact that our estimations are potentially slightly biased and mitigate the problem by excluding the immediately preceding value from ASYLUMSTOCK. Also, Nickell (1981) has 62 Greene 2002, 939, 63 Cameron and Trivedi 1998. 19 shown that the bias becomes smaller with rising T and the time dimension of our panel is higher than in many other panels where T can be as small as two or three.
The Dependent Variable
The 68 For example, before 1991 it was not possible for persons from non-European countries to apply for asylum in
Italy (Böcker 1998, 3) . Practically no statistical information exists for these other refugees and illegal immigrants.
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representing the economic incentive for migration. 69 In accordance with our theoretical
considerations, we pre-tested for a non-linear effect of economic development on migration flows. However, we found no evidence for such an effect and therefore excluded the squared term from the main estimations reported below. We also include the average annual growth rate over the last three years (GROWTH) as another measure of economic hardship since average living standards typically deteriorate in times of economic crisis, independently of the income level. In addition, we included an index of economic discrimination against ethnic minorities (ECONDISCRIMINATION) from the Minorities at Risk dataset, which codes the severity of discrimination on a 0 to 4 scale. 70 This index was multiplied by the population share of the minority discriminated against. In the case of several minorities the sum of all population weighted discrimination indices was taken. To capture the effect that people in their working age are more likely to migrate, we include the share of 15 to 64 year olds among the total population in the country of origin (%POP15-64).
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To measure political oppression we constructed an autocracy variable as the unweighted sum of the political rights and civil liberties index (AUTOCRACY) published by Freedom House. 72 In this source, political rights refer to, for example, the freedom to organize in political parties or groupings, the existence of party competition and an effective opposition as well as the existence and fairness of elections including the possibility of taking power via those elections. Civil liberties refer to, for example, the freedom of the media, the right to open and free discussion, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of religious expression, the 
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protection from political terror and the prevalence of the rule of law. The two indices are based on surveys among experts assessing the extent to which a country effectively respects political rights and civil liberties, both measured on a 1 (best) to 7 (worst) scale. In accordance with our theoretical considerations, we pre-tested for a non-linear effect of autocracy on asylum migration. There is some weak evidence for such an effect in the results reported below.
Using Freedom House data over a period of time is not unproblematic since the scale, with which countries are judged changes slightly over time and it is not designed as a series.
Indeed, some cases (for example, Mexico and Uruguay) rise and fall along the scale in association with global changes in the number of countries that are democratic in years in which these countries exhibited no institutional change. This is particularly problematic in the middle parts of the Freedom House scale. The Polity data for measuring democracy do not suffer from this problem, but since they are available for fewer countries than Freedom House data, they are used here only in sensitivity analysis. The Polity data are also based on experts' judgments of aspects of institutionalized democracy and autocracy, both measured on an (additive) 0 to 10 scale. 73 The autocracy score is subtracted from the democracy score such that the combined variable takes on values between -10 and 10. We reversed this variable such that higher values represent more autocratic regimes (POLITY).
As a measure of human rights violations (RIGHTSVIOLATION), we use the two Purdue Political Terror Scales (PTS). One of the two PTS is based upon a codification of country
information from Amnesty International's annual human rights reports to a scale from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). Analogously, the other scale is based upon information from the US Department Genocide and politicide are defined as the calculated physical destruction of a communal or political group in whole or part.
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With respect to interstate war, we wondered whether the fact that existing refugee studies find this variable to be insignificant might be due to the high threshold of 1000 battle deaths used for coding a conflict as interstate war in the commonly used Correlates of War data set.
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We therefore constructed a variable measuring the extent of external armed conflict (EXTERNALWAR) based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project. 82 The variable is coded as zero if there was no armed conflict on the territory of a country. It is coded as one if there was a minor armed conflict, defined as any type of armed conflict resulting in more than 25 but less than 1000 casualties in any one year. The variable was coded as two if the conflict was of intermediate nature, defined as at least 25 but less than 1000 casualties in any one year in addition to an accumulated total of at least 1000 deaths. Three is the code for large conflicts, which require more than 1000 battle deaths in a single year to qualify. Note that the 78 Data from Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2001. 79 We add 0.5 to the original score to distinguish the absence of such events from the presence of such events with an annual number of deaths of less than 300.
80 Harff and Gurr 1988 . 81 Singer 2003. 82 Gleditsch et al. 2002. 25 reference point for coding is whether the conflict takes place on the territory of a country. A conflict is not coded for a country participating in a conflict outside its own territory as this cannot be expected to create refugees in this country.
To measure the threat coming from natural disasters to people's personal integrity, we constructed a variable counting the total aggregate number of deaths from droughts, earthquakes, epidemics, extreme temperatures, insect infestations, floods, earth slides, volcano eruptions, sea waves and surges, wild fires and wind storms (NATURALDISASTER). 83 To test for the effect of famines and food insecurity on asylum migration, we take net per capita food production (FOOD), indexed with base years 1989 to 1991, as our proxy variable.
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To see whether cultural similarity is a facilitating factor lowering the costs of migration,
we included the percentage of Christians in the country of origin (%CHRIST). 85 Aid and trade in per cent of GDP (AID and TRADE) as well as the number of tourist arrivals (TOURISTS) in the country of origin are taken to test for whether the extent of casual contact with the outside world has a significant impact upon flows of asylum seeking. 86 We interpolate these data for missing years to avoid further reductions in sample size.
To test for the colonial link effect, we included the number of years between 1900 and 1960 a country has been a former colony of any European destination country (COLONY).
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Another important facilitating factor is geographical proximity. The closer a country of origin is to Western Europe, the easier it is to reach these countries and file an asylum application. 
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We capture this by the minimum air distance between the capital city of the country of origin and the capital city of the closest Western European country (DISTANCE).
88
The presence of so-called migration networks is commonly regarded as an important facilitator. 89 Unfortunately, we were not able to find reliable data on the size of communities from origin countries in Western European destination countries. In its absence, we take the moving sum of asylum applicants from the prior five to two years as our proxy of migration networks (ASYLUMSTOCK).
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Other potentially important deterrents, which we could not take into account due to lack of data, include visa requirements, asylum procedures and recognition rates, regulations with regard to welfare benefits and working rights of asylum seekers, forced removal and repatriation rates etc. In as much as they apply to asylum seekers from all countries similarly, these effects will, however, be covered by our use of year-specific time dummies.
Finally, we include population size (POPULATION) as a control variable since countries of origin with a greater population size might also send more asylum seekers to EU countries, all other things equal. Also, people living in cities are likely to be better informed about migration possibilities and are more footloose. We therefore include the urbanization rate
(%URBAN).
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We log those explanatory variables which are strictly positive and for which an elasticity interpretation of their coefficients makes sense in the estimations in which the dependent variable is also logged, namely the asylum stock, population, income and minimum distance 88 Data from Bennett and Stam 2001 . 89 Böcker 1998. 90 We do not include the number of asylum seekers in the immediately preceding year to mitigate correlation with the error term. Note that at the start of the panel this variable goes back fewer years to avoid a five year loss of observations. Table 2 presents some summary information on all variables. Variance inflation factors were computed to check for multicollinearity. The factors for all individual variables are below 5 with the mean value below 2. There is therefore no reason to be concerned about multicollinearity.
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Results
Column I of table 3 reports FE estimation results for the base model. Column II reports GEE estimation results, where we can now also add the time-invariant distance, colonial experience and religious similarity variables. In column III we add the dissident violent event count variable, which is unavailable after 1995 and therefore reduces the sample size considerably.
In column IV we further add the aid, trade and tourism variables, which have lower availability and reduce the sample size considerably. Column V reports results from the Negative Binomial Regression Model with the same independent variables as in column II.
Starting with column I, the lagged sum of asylum flows is highly significant, supporting the hypothesis of migration networks. All three economic variables are statistically significant with the expected sign: higher income and economic growth lower, whereas greater economic discrimination against ethnic minorities raises asylum migration. The share of people in their working age is insignificant, however. Autocracy has the expected bell-shaped impact as greater autocracy first increases and then lowers asylum migration. Not all threats to personal integrity are statistically significant. Threats that stem from human rights violations and civil and ethnic wars or the collapse of state authority are positively associated with asylum flows.
In contrast, neither genocide/politicide nor external armed conflict are statistically significant.
The same is true for threats to personal integrity stemming from natural disasters and food 92 The results of our analysis would not be dramatically different if these variables were not logged.
93 Kennedy 1992. 28 shortages. None of our two control variables -population size and urbanization rate -are statistically significant.
Results from GEE estimation for the economic and threat to personal security variables are very similar to those from FE estimation. The only difference is that the external conflict variable becomes marginally significant at the .1 level with the expected positive sign. Both population size and the share of people in their working age now become significant with the expected positive sign. One explanation for this change is due to the small variation of these variables over time, which results in large standard errors in FE estimation results due to inefficient within-time estimation. However, the urbanization rate, which also varies little over time, remains insignificant as before. As concerns our newly added time-invariant variables, distance is a highly statistically significant deterrent. Neither religious similarity nor former colonial experience appear to matter, however. Results are hardly affected if DISSIDENTVIOLENCE is added in column III. Events of dissident violence are positively associated with asylum seeking as expected. If anything, former colonies send fewer asylum seekers to Western Europe.
The aid, trade and tourism arrival variables are added to GEE estimation in column IV.
Neither aid nor trade are significant and if anything a higher inflow of tourists is associated with smaller numbers of asylum seekers. Results for the other variables are very similar in terms of sign and statistical significance of coefficients. The main difference is that there is no longer a non-linear effect of autocracy. The squared term was insignificant and the reported results therefore refer to the model with the linear term only.
Sensitivity Analysis
As mentioned above, we employed a population-averaged Negative Binomial Regression
Model to directly account for the count data characteristic of the unlogged dependent variable 29 and test the sensitivity of our results to model mis-specification. The estimation results are very similar in terms of coefficient sign and statistical significance (see column V of table 3).
The only difference is that the squared democracy, the economic discrimination, the ethnic/civil war and state failure variables are no longer statistically significant.
In further sensitivity analysis, we tested the effect of outliers on our estimation results.
Due to space constraints, we merely describe, but no longer report, the detailed results here.
To start with, we took all countries from the former Yugoslavia out of the sample. This is due to the extraordinarily high influx of people from these countries fleeing to Western Europe in the early to mid-1990s. Our results are hardly affected by their exclusion. This could at least partly be due to the fact that Western European governments faced with a large-scale influx of asylum seekers from these countries took them out of the normal system based on individual decision of asylum claims and provided them with temporary group protection. 94 As a more general treatment of outliers, we exclude observations that have both high residuals and a high leverage. 95 The criterion is to exclude an observation if its so-called DFITS is greater than twice the square root of (k/n), where k is the number of independent variables and n the number of observations. DFITS is defined as the square root of (h i /(1-h i )), where h i is an observation's leverage, multiplied by its studentized residual. Applying this criterion leads to the exclusion of 106 observations. Results are not much affected, however. 95 Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 1980. with the POLITY measure, which has poorer data availability but is more consistent in its definition across time as discussed above, then the non-linear effect is no longer apparent and greater autocracy linearly raises the number of people seeking asylum in Western Europe.
Discussion
Our results suggest a complex mix of determinants of asylum migration. There is clear What accounts for the fact that the genocide/politicide, famine and natural disaster variables all turn out to be insignificant? One explanation is that people fleeing from these events are likely to remain in neighboring developing countries and/or become IDPs within their own country, which is why studies looking at refugee and IDP flows in developing countries find them to be statistically significant, particularly the genocide/politicide variable.
Another explanation could be that these tend to be short-term and one-off events. In contrast, poverty, economic discrimination against ethnic minorities, human rights violations, autocratic regime and even civil/ethnic warfare are more persistent events. Given that migration to Western Europe probably requires some planning and preparation we are not surprised to find that factors to which people are exposed to more persistently over time are more significant determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe than short-term and one-off events. This might even explain the fact that we find only some evidence that external armed conflict matters. Such conflict is not only very infrequent compared to ethnic/civil war and state failure, but such conflicts also tend to have a short duration. 
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The insignificance of colonial ties is a rather striking result. These ties might influence the specific country in which asylum seekers coming to Western Europe will settle 98 , but former European colonies do not send more asylum seekers into Western Europe as a whole than non-colonies. That religious ties are insignificant confirms studies examining the specific destination choice within the EU. 99 The same is true for any potential contact established by aid, trade or flows of tourism. These are likely to be far too casual to have a significant impact upon asylum migration. Like other studies, we find that migration networks and geographical distance are highly significant determinants of asylum migration.
Conclusions
Are asylum seekers in Western Europe economic migrants or 'genuine' refugees? As our analysis is at the aggregate level, we can say nothing definite about individuals. What we can say is that economic conditions in countries of origin are statistically significant and substantively important determinants of aggregate asylum migration to Western Europe. This implies that policies aimed at improving economic conditions in these countries, such as generous development assistance and the opening of protected European markets to imports from developing countries, can lower the migration pressure from these countries. This pressure on Western Europe will remain as long as income levels are so widely different.
Indeed, the divergence in income levels means that the pressure is bound to increase further. 100 We find no evidence for a bell-shaped effect of income levels in origin countries on 98 Böcker 1998. 99 ibid.
100 Cole and Neumayer 2003. 33 asylum flows, the so-called migration hump, and therefore reject the suggestion that "poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy" 101 or is so only in the long-run 102 .
At the same time, our results clearly demonstrate the importance of the political regime in origin countries and of threats to the personal integrity of individuals from human rights abuse, dissident political violence, civil/ethnic warfare and state failure as well as possibly external conflict. Indeed, we found autocracy to be the substantively most important cause.
This puts the perception that almost all asylum seekers are merely searching for better economic conditions into great doubt. Notes: Coefficients of year-specific dummy variables and constant not shown. Absolute tvalues or z-values in parentheses. Standard errors robust towards arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Observations assumed to be independent across countries, but not within countries (clustering). * significant at .1 level ** at .05 level *** at .01 level. 
